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SCHOLARLY ARTICLE

Tort Reform and Jury Instructions
By Charles W. Adams

T

his article discusses two recent statutes and the efforts of the
Oklahoma Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions (Civil
OUJI Committee) to recommend uniform jury instructions
based on these statutes to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The first
statute is Okla. Stat. Title 12, §577.4, which deals with an instruction to juries that awards for damages for personal injuries and
wrongful death that are nontaxable. The second statute is Okla.
Stat. Title 23, §61.2, which imposes a $350,000 cap on noneconomic losses for personal injuries.
The Civil OUJI Committee determined that
both statutes raised possible constitutional
issues, and so, decided to flag these issues in its
recommendations to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. The committee comments to the proposed jury instruction on nontaxability of damages awards pointed out that there were
instances when damages for personal injury
awards were taxable and that there may be a
constitutional question whether Okla. Stat.
Title 12, §577.4 violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The Civil OUJI Committee presented two alternatives for the proposed jury
instruction on the $350,000 cap on noneconomic losses for personal injuries. The first alternative followed the language of Okla. Stat. Title
23, §61.2 and did not inform the jury of the
$350,000 cap on noneconomic losses, but it
noted a constitutional question in the committee comments to the jury instruction. The second alternative informed the jury of the
$350,000 cap on noneconomic losses, contrary
to a provision in Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2, and
it explained the reason for doing so in the committee comments to the jury instruction and
verdict form.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not adopt
the proposed jury instruction on nontaxability
Vol. 86 — No. 11 — 4/18/2015

of damages awards or either alternative for the
$350,000 cap on noneconomic losses that the
Civil OUJI Committee had proposed. Without
having the benefit of actual cases before it, the
Supreme Court declined to resolve the possible
constitutional issues raised by the two statutes.
This article provides a brief discussion of the
possible constitutional issues that are raised by
the two statutes, and it includes the text of the
proposed recommendations that the Civil OUJI
Committee presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
NONTAXABILITY OF AWARDS FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES AND
WRONGFUL DEATH
The only case in which the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
whether a jury instruction on the taxability of
an award of damages should be given is Missouri-K.T.R.R. v. Miller.1 The case was brought
under the Federal Employers Liability Act
(FELA), and on appeal, the defendant argued
that the trial court erred by admitting evidence
of the plaintiff’s gross income without giving
instructions on the income tax on future earnings. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
the income tax consequences of the injury and
the award should not be considered by the
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jury.2 The original edition of the Oklahoma
Uniform Jury Instructions (OUJI) provided at
Instruction No. 4.17, which was titled “Effect of
Income Tax on Award of Damages: ‘No Instruction Should Be Given’.” The comment to Instruction No. 4.17 stated: “In Missouri-K.T.R.R
v. Miller, 486 P.2d 630, 636 (Okla. 1971), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the
income tax consequences of injury and award
are not a proper consideration for the jury.”
Instruction No. 4.17 was not changed until
2014.
The Oklahoma Legislature adopted Okla.
Stat. Title 12, §577.4 in 2011. It provides:
The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions
(OUJI) applicable in a civil case shall
include an instruction notifying the jury
that no part of an award for damages for
personal injury or wrongful death is subject to federal or state income tax. Any
amount that the jury determines to be
proper compensation for personal injury or
wrongful death should not be increased or
decreased by any consideration for income
taxes. In order to be admitted at trial, any
exhibit relating to damage awards shall
reflect accurate tax ramifications.
This statute is unusual because it is directed
to the content of the OUJI, rather than the law
that governs in the state courts. In addition, it
involves the effect of federal income tax law,
rather than state law. Although in most cases,
damages for personal injuries are not subject to
federal income tax, there are circumstances
where they may be taxable. For example, if a
taxpayer had deducted medical expenses in a
previous tax year, a recovery for medical
expenses would be taxable.3 In addition, unlike
compensatory damages for personal injuries,
punitive damages are taxable, but the jury
would not be aware of this distinction unless it
was instructed on it. Moreover, the statute
refers only to the taxability of a damages
award to a plaintiff, but it does not address
whether a damages award would be deductible by a defendant. The statute is also problematic, because it directs that juries must be
informed that damages awards for personal
injuries are not taxable, thereby inviting them
to consider income taxes, but then it states that
juries must not increase or decrease their
awards on account of any consideration for
income taxes. Finally, instructing juries on the
applicable law in a case is a judicial function,
rather than a legislative function, and there822

The statute is also
problematic, because it directs that
juries must be informed that
damages awards for personal
injuries are not taxable, thereby
inviting them to consider income
taxes, but then it states that juries
must not increase or decrease
their awards on account of any consideration for income taxes.
fore, section 577.4 may violate the separation of
powers doctrine in the Okla. Const., Art. 4, §1.
The Civil OUJI Committee submitted the following proposed revisions to Instruction 4.174
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 2012:
Instruction No. 4.17
Effect Of Income Tax On Award Of Damages
NO INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN
[Name of Plaintiff] will not be required
to pay any federal or state income taxes on
any amount that you award for damages
for (personal injury)/(wrongful death).
[This rule does not apply to [the portion of]
the claim of [Name of Plaintiff] for [specify those claims that are subject to federal
or state income taxes]]. You should not
add to or subtract from the amount, if any,
you determine to be proper compensation
for (personal injury)/(wrongful death)
because of income taxes.
Notes on Use
This Instruction should be given only in
cases where the damages sought for personal injury or wrongful death are nontaxable. The second sentence that is shown in
brackets should be given if there are claims
or portions of a claim that are taxable so
that the jury instruction will not be inaccurate or confusing to the jury. The trial
court should decide what damages are or
are not subject to income tax based on the
circumstances of the particular case.
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Instruction No. 4.17

Comments
This Instruction is included on account of
12 O.S. 2011 §577.4. See also 26 U.S.C.
§104(a)(2) (damages for personal physical
injuries, other than punitive damages, are
not taxable). The exclusion for damages for
personal physical injuries covers not only
medical bills but also amounts awarded for
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, and
lost earnings. See C.I.R. v. Schleier, 515 U.S.
323, 329 (1995) (dictum); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Fed. Inc.
Tax’n of Indiv. ¶7.03 (2011) (“When the
exclusion [for damages for personal physical injuries] applies, it covers all elements
of actual damages — nonpecuniary damages (pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment,
and the like, medical expenses, and lost
wages).”). Amounts received for personal
injuries are taxable, however, to the extent
that they are attributable to deductions
allowed for medical and other similar
expenses. See 26 CFR Part 1 §1.104-1 (a). In
addition, damages for emotional distress
are taxable unless the emotional distress is
attributable to a physical injury. Id. §1-104
(c). This brief summary of the federal and
state tax law is not exhaustive.
In Missouri-K.T. R.R. v. Miller, 1971 OK 68,
¶38, 486 P.2d 630, 636 (Okla. 1971), the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the
income tax consequences of injury and
award are not a proper consideration for
the jury. There may be a question whether
12 O.S. 2011 §577.4 violates the separationof-powers doctrine described in Yocum v.
Greenbriar Nursing Home, 2005 OK 27, ¶13,
130 P.3d 213, 220, as follows:
Legislative power is mainly confined to
making law, while the judiciary is invested primarily with an adjudicative function — the authority to hear and determine forensic disputes. A legislative
removal of the discretionary component
in adjudicative process is a usurpation
of the courts’ freedom that is essential to
the judiciary’s independence from the
other two branches.
Instructing a jury on the applicable law in
a case is a fundamental adjudicative function, rather than a legislative function.
In its order dated March 24, 2014,5 the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the following
revision to Instruction No. 4.17:
Vol. 86 — No. 11 — 4/18/2015

Effect Of Income Tax On Award of Damages
NO INSTRUCTION SHOULD BE GIVEN
Comments
Title 12 O.S. 2011 §577.4 (Laws 2011, c. 16,
§1, eff. Nov. 1, 2011), reads as follows:
Tax Consequences of Award for Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death
Actions
The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions
(OUJI) applicable in a civil case shall
include an instruction notifying the jury
that no part of an award for damages for
personal injury or wrongful death is subject to federal or state income tax. Any
amount that the jury determines to be
proper compensation for personal injury or
wrongful death should not be increased or
decreased by any consideration for income
taxes. In order to be admitted at trial, any
exhibit relating to damage awards shall
reflect accurate tax ramifications.
In Missouri-K.T.R.R. v. Miller, 1971 OK 68
¶38, 486 P.2d 630, 636, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled that the income tax
consequences of a personal injury award
are not a proper consideration for the jury.
While the Supreme Court’s order deleted the
capitalized direction that no instruction should
be given, it did not specify how the trial court
should instruct the jury on the effect of income
tax on the award of damages. The order quoted
Okla. Stat. Title 12, §577.4 in the comments,
and it also retained the prior comments, which
cited the Missouri-K.T.R.R. case and stated that
income tax consequences are not a proper subject for the jury. Instead of resolving how trial
courts should instruct juries on the tax consequences of damages awards, the Supreme
Court gave mixed signals. Thus, it appears that
the Oklahoma Supreme Court will require the
issues surrounding the giving of jury instructions on the taxability of damages awards to be
presented in the context of a justiciable controversy,6 instead of in the context of reviewing
proposed revisions to Instruction No. 4.17 from
the Civil OUJI Committee, in order for it to
resolve whether and how juries should be
instructed on the tax consequences of damages
awards. The standard of review on appeal for
jury instructions “is whether the jury was misled to the extent of rendering a different verdict
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than it would have rendered, if the alleged
errors had not occurred.”7 Seeking an extraordinary writ in an original proceeding may be
another means to obtain review by the Oklahoma Supreme Court of jury instructions on
the taxability of damages awards by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.8
THE $350,000 CAP ON DAMAGES FOR
NONECONOMIC LOSS
The original version of Okla. Stat. Title 23,
§61.2 was enacted in 2009 as part of the Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act.9 It provided
for a $400,000 cap on damages, but it was conditioned on the establishment of a Health Care
Indemnity Fund, which would be used to pay
damages for noneconomic losses in medical
malpractice cases that exceeded the cap.10 The
Health Care Indemnity Fund was never established, but the requirement for it was removed
when Okla. Stat. Title 12, §61.2 was amended in
2011. In addition, the amount of the cap was
reduced from $400,000 to $350,000.11 The statute
also provides that there is no limit on the amount
of noneconomic damages if the judge and jury
determine by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant’s actions were in reckless disregard for the rights of others, grossly negligent,
fraudulent or intentional or with malice.12
Jury instructions on how the jury should
allocate damages between economic and noneconomic losses would certainly be needed if
the jury’s award were to include noneconomic
losses in excess of the $350,000 cap. The Civil
OUJI Committee decided that the jury instructions should not have to be given in every case
where a plaintiff sought more than $350,000 for
total compensatory damages, however, because
the plaintiff might not actually recover more
than $350,000. The Civil OUJI Committee concluded that jury instructions on the $350,000
cap should be reserved for a second stage of
the trial that would be held if the jury awarded
more than $350,000 for total compensatory
damages in the first stage. The Committee recognized, though, that whether to have two
stages or a single stage was a matter for the
trial court’s discretion.
The next issue that the Civil OUJI Committee
considered was whether the $350,000 cap
should be applied to the damages that the jury
determined were sustained by the plaintiff, or
to the amount of the award after reduction for
the percentage of the plaintiff’s comparative
fault. The statute did not expressly address this
824

issue, but the Civil OUJI Committee noted that
paragraph B defined the $350,000 cap in terms
of “the amount of compensation which a trier
of fact may award a plaintiff for noneconomic
loss” and paragraph D required the verdict to
specify the “total compensatory damages recoverable by the plaintiff.” The Civil OUJI Committee concluded that this wording favored an
interpretation that the $350,000 cap should be
applied to the net amount after reduction for the
percentage of the plaintiff’s comparative fault,
because that amount was what the trier of fact
would award the plaintiff and what would be
recoverable by the plaintiff.
The Civil OUJI Committee also addressed
the constitutionality of Okla. Stat. Title 23,
§61.2(F) of the statute, which provides:
F. In any civil action arising from claimed
bodily injury which is tried to a jury, the
jury shall not be instructed with respect to
the limit on noneconomic damages set
forth in subsection B of this section, nor
shall counsel for any party, nor any witness
inform the jury or potential jurors of such
limitations.
Paragraph F appears to conflict with Article
7, §15 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which
provides: “In all jury trials the jury shall return
a general verdict, and no law in force, nor any
law hereafter enacted, shall require the court to
direct the jury to make findings of particular
questions of fact, but the court may, in its discretion, direct such special findings.” In Smith
v. Gizzi,13 the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed how Article 7, §15 applied to the Oklahoma comparative negligence statute,14 which
provided for a plaintiff’s recovery to be diminished in proportion to a plaintiff’s negligence.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that a
special verdict was characterized by the jury
being limited to making special findings and
not knowing the legal effect of its answers.15
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s use
of a verdict that included special findings concerning the percentage of negligence attributable to both the plaintiff and defendant, because
the jury instructions and verdict form informed
the jury of the effect that the special findings
would have on the outcome. The Supreme
Court explained:
The jury not only must know the legal
effect of its findings, but must determine
the ultimate result, limited only by the special findings as to each parties [sic] degree
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of negligence. Such special findings are
constitutionally and statutorily permitted.
Under a general verdict, a jury must know
the effect of its answers or it is not a general verdict.16
The problem presented by Okla. Stat. Title 23,
§61.2(F) is that it states that the jury must not
be instructed or informed with respect to the
limit on noneconomic damages, and therefore,
it appears to conflict with Okla. Const. Art. 7,
§15, as interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Smith v. Gizzi.
As a result of the apparent conflict between
Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2(F) and Okla. Const.
Art. 7, §15, the Civil OUJI Committee submitted to the Oklahoma Supreme Court two alternative versions of proposed jury instructions
and verdict forms concerning the $350,000 cap
on noneconomic loss. The first alternative did
not refer to the $350,000 cap on noneconomic
loss, but the comments to the jury explained
that there was a potential question concerning
the constitutionality of not instructing the jury
with respect to the $350,000 cap on noneconomic loss. The text of the first alternative is set
out below.
Instruction No. 9.52 (First Alternative)
Supplemental Verdict Form
Specifying Economic and Noneconomic
Losses
Directions
Now that you have returned a verdict in
favor of [Plaintiff] in the amount of $
________ for the total compensatory damages for [Plaintiff], you must now make
additional findings on the Supplemental
Verdict Form. [On the Supplemental Verdict Form, you must specify what portion
of the total compensatory damages is for
economic loss for [Plaintiff] and what portion of the total compensatory damages is
for noneconomic loss for [Plaintiff].]
[First, you must decide whether or not
you find by clear and convincing evidence
that the conduct [was/(amounted to)]
[(reckless disregard for the rights of others)/(gross negligence)/fraud/(intentional
or malicious)], and then indicate what you
have decided with a check mark.]
[“Reckless disregard of another’s rights”
means that the defendant was either aware,
or did not care, that there was a substantial
and unnecessary risk that his, her or its
Vol. 86 — No. 11 — 4/18/2015

conduct would cause serious injury to others. In order for the conduct to be in reckless disregard of another’s rights, it must
have been unreasonable under the circumstances and there must have been a high
probability that the conduct would cause
serious harm to another person.]
[“Gross negligence” means the want of
slight care and diligence.]
[“Fraud” consists of the following acts
committed with intent to deceive another
party: (the suggestion, as a fact, of that
which is not true, by one who does not
believe it to be true)/ (the positive assertion in a manner not warranted by the
information of the person making it, of
that which is not true, though he believe
it to be true)/(the suppression of that
which is true, by one having knowledge
or belief of the fact)/(a promise made
without any intention of performing it).]
[“Malice” involves hatred, spite or ill
will, or the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse.]
[If you find by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct [was/(amounted
to)] [(reckless disregard for the rights of
others)/(gross negligence)/fraud/(intentional or malicious)], you must then specify what portion of the total compensatory
damages is for economic loss for [Plaintiff]
and what portion of the total compensatory damages is for noneconomic loss for
[Plaintiff].]
“Economic loss” means any type of
financial harm, past or future, from a bodily injury including:
1. All wages, salaries or other compensation;
2. All costs for medical care or treatment,
rehabilitation services, or other care, treatment, services, products or accommodations, and
3. Any other costs on account of a bodily
injury.
“Noneconomic loss” means any type of
nonfinancial harm from a bodily injury
including damages for pain and suffering,
loss of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection,
advice, guidance, counsel, instruction,
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training, education, disfigurement, mental
anguish and any other intangible loss.
Notes on Use
This Instruction and the following Supplemental Verdict Form should be used if
the jury has returned a verdict for personal
injury to a plaintiff of more than $350,000
after reduction for any percentage of comparative negligence. The trial court should
list only the examples of economic and
noneconomic loss and the definitions of
fraud, gross negligence, intent, malice, and
reckless disregard of another’s rights that
are applicable. The trial court should include the paragraph of this instruction
concerning the finding by clear and convincing evidence with respect to the conduct of the defendant only if the applicable
conduct of the defendant has been alleged
and supported by proof at trial.
If there have not been allegations of
fraud, gross negligence, intent, malice, and
reckless disregard of another’s rights, or
they have not been supported by proof at
trial, the trial court should include the sentence of the first paragraph that appears in
brackets, omit the next paragraphs that
appear in brackets, and then give the definitions of economic and noneconomic loss
in the instruction. On the other hand, if
there have been allegations of fraud, gross
negligence, intent, malice, and reckless disregard of another’s rights that have been
supported by proof at trial, the trial court
should omit the sentence of the first paragraph that appears in brackets, and then
give the next paragraphs in brackets that
are applicable along with the definitions of
economic and noneconomic loss in the
instruction.
This instruction and the following Supplemental Verdict Form contemplate a two
stage process in which the jury would first
return a verdict, and then if the verdict for
bodily injury exceeds $350,000 after reduction for any comparative negligence of the
plaintiff, the jury would then allocate the
amount of compensatory damages between
economic and noneconomic losses. If the
verdict was for the defendant or did not
exceed $350,000, it would be unnecessary
for the jury to address the allocation between economic and noneconomic losses,
and therefore, a two stage process would
826

be more efficient than a single stage process. Also, a two stage process could be less
confusing for the jury if the jury was also
determining comparative negligence. A
single stage process might be more efficient
in some cases, however, and then it would
be appropriate for the trial court to exercise
its discretion to consolidate the two stages
into a single stage by combining the substance of this instruction and the Supplemental Form to the appropriate instructions and verdict forms.
Comments
This instruction and the following Supplemental Verdict Form conform to the
requirements of 23 O.S. 2011 §61.2, which
applies to actions filed on or after Nov. 1,
2011. Id. §61.2(I). Section 61.2 requires the
jury to return a general verdict accompanied by interrogatories that specify the
plaintiff’s total compensatory damages,
and the portions of the total compensatory
damages for economic and noneconomic
loss. Id. §61.2(D). In addition, §61.2(E) requires the jury to specify, if alleged, whether the conduct of the defendant was, or
amounted to, reckless disregard for the
rights of others, gross negligence, fraud, or
intentional or malicious conduct. Section
61.2(F) provides that the jury shall not be
instructed with respect to the $350,000 limit on noneconomic loss.
There may be a question concerning the
constitutionality of not instructing the jury
with respect to the limit on noneconomic
damages. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
addressed the application of Okla. Const.
Art., VII, §15 to Oklahoma’s comparative
negligence statutes in Smith v. Gizzi, 1977
OK 91, 564 P.2d 1009. Art. VII, §15 provides: “In all jury trials the jury shall return
a general verdict, and no law in force nor
any law hereafter enacted, shall require the
court to direct the jury to make findings of
particular questions of fact but the court
may, in its discretion, direct such special
findings.” The Supreme Court held that the
comparative negligence statutes did not
violate Art., VII, §15, because they did not
require a special verdict. The Supreme
Court reasoned that under a general verdict, the jury must know the effect of its
answers to special findings, and that if the
jury did not know the effect of its answers,
the verdict would be a special verdict that
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would violate Okla. Const. Art., VII, §15.
1977 OK 91, ¶11-12, 564 P.2d 1009, 1012-13.
Instruction No. 9.53 (First Alternative)
Supplemental Verdict Form
Specifying Economic and Noneconomic
Losses
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF ____________
COUNTY,
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
______________
Plaintiff,
vs.
______________
Defendant,

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. ______

SUPPLEMENTAL VERDICT FORM
We, the jury, empaneled and sworn in the
above entitled cause, do, upon our oaths, find
as follows:
1. The amount of total compensatory damages awarded [after reduction for comparative
negligence] to [Plaintiff] is $ ____________ [to
be filled in by the trial court].
The portion of total compensatory damages
for economic loss is $ ____________; and
The portion of total compensatory damages
for noneconomic loss is $ ____________.
The sum of the portions for economic and
noneconomic loss must equal the total compensatory damages set out above.
2. We further find by clear and convincing
evidence that the conduct of [Defendant]
(Check any that are applicable):
____ was in reckless disregard for the rights
of others
____ amounted to gross negligence
____ amounted to fraud
____ was intentional or malicious
____ none of the above
_________________
Foreperson
_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________

_________________
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_________________

Notes on Use
This Supplemental Verdict Form should
be used if the jury has returned a verdict
for personal injury to a plaintiff of more
than $350,000 after reduction for any percentage of comparative negligence. The
trial court should specify the net award
after reduction for any percentage of comparative negligence in paragraph 1. The
trial court should include paragraph 2 to
the extent that any applicable conduct of
the defendant has been alleged and supported by proof at trial.
The second alternative that the Civil OUJI
Committee submitted to the Oklahoma Supreme Court differed from the first alternative
by including the following language in both
proposed Instruction No. 9.52 and the verdict
form in Instruction 9.53 to inform the jury of
the $350,000 cap on noneconomic loss:
The law provides that the amount of
compensation for noneconomic loss from
all defendants is limited to $350,000, unless
you find by clear and convincing evidence
that their conduct [was/(amounted to)]
[(reckless disregard for the rights of others)/(gross negligence)/fraud/(intentional
or malicious)].
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not
include any instruction or verdict form concerning the $350,000 cap for noneconomic
losses in its order dated March 24, 2014, which
adopted amendments to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions — Civil (Second).17 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court eventually will have
to resolve how juries should be instructed in
personal injury cases where the $350,000 cap
applies, but the Supreme Court will require a
justiciable controversy to do so.
CONCLUSION
The statutes dealing with the taxability of
damages for personal injuries and the $350,000
cap on noneconomic losses present challenges
for drafting jury instructions because they may
involve possible constitutional issues. Resolution of these issues will require attorneys to
make appropriate records in the trial courts
and then to raise these issues properly on
appeal.
1. 1971 OK 68, ¶38, 486 P.2d 630, 636.
2. Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on an annotation at 63
A.L.R.2d 1393, which indicated that the United States Supreme Court
and all but one state supreme court had ruled that income tax considerations should not be considered, because they were too conjectural.
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After the Missouri-K.T.R.R. decision, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1980), that a
brief jury instruction explaining that damages received on account of
personal injuries are not taxable income was required as a matter of
federal law for all FELA cases in order to prevent jurors from mistakenly increasing awards to compensate for the effect of income taxes.
3. See 26 CFR Part 1 §1.104-1 (a). Also, an award of damages for
emotional distress is taxable if it is not attributable to a physical injury.
Id. §1.104-1 (c).
4. The Civil OUJI Committee also submitted a proposed revision to
Instruction No. 5.9, which stated that punitive damages were taxable.
The Notes on Use to the proposed revision said that the instruction on
taxability of punitive damages should be given in the second stage of
the trial, only if the trial court instructed the jury that the plaintiff
would not be required to pay income taxes on an award for damages
for personal injury or wrongful death during the first stage of the trial.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not adopt the proposed revision to
Instruction No. 5.9, but it did update several citations in the Notes on
Use to Instruction No. 5.9.
5. In re: Amendments to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions,
2014 OK 17.
6. See Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa, 2011 OK 57, ¶13, 270
P.3d 113, 120 (“The term ‘justiciable’ refers to a lively case or controversy between antagonistic demands.”).
7. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 2002 OK 24 ¶17, 45 P.3d 86, 93.
8. See Okla. Const. Art. 7, §4; Okla. Stat. Title 12, §1451; Okla. Sup.
Ct. R. 1.190-1.191.
9. 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 228, §24. The Comprehensive Lawsuit
Reform Act was declared unconstitutional in Douglas v. Cox Retirement
Props., 2013 OK 37, 302 P.3d 789, because the Oklahoma legislature
passed it through unconstitutional log-rolling in violation of the single
subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5,§57. Section 24 was not affected by
Douglas, however, because Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2 was amended by
a separate statute before Douglas was decided.

10. Id. at ¶A, J.
11. 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 14, §1.
12. Okla. Stat. Title 23, §61.2(C).
13. 1977 OK 91, 564 P.2d 1009.
14. Okla. Stat. Title 23, §11 (Supp. 1976), repealed, 1979 Okla. Session
Laws c. 38 §14. .
15. Smith, 1977 OK 91, ¶11, 564 P.2d 1009, 1013.
16. d.
17. In re: Amendments to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions,
2014 OK 17.
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NOTICE OF HEARING ON THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT
OF LOUIS J. BODNAR, SCBD #6202
TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION
Notice is hereby given pursuant to Rule 11.3(b), Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S., Ch. 1, App. 1-A, that a hearing will be
held to determine if Louis J. Bodnar should be reinstated to active
membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association.
Any person desiring to be heard in opposition to or in support of the
petition may appear before the Professional Responsibility Tribunal
at the Oklahoma Bar Center at 1901 North Lincoln Boulevard, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 14, 2015. Any
person wishing to appear should contact Gina Hendryx, General
Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, P.O. Box 53036, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma 73152, telephone (405) 416-7007.
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